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doctrine by establishing that con-
tainers and compartments could be 
included in a warrantless search of 
an automobile, provided the search 
was supported by probable cause. 
Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1986. Ross, 
however, distinguished the Carroll 
doctrine from the separate rule gov-
erning searches of closed containers 
established in Chadwick and Sand-
search incident to a lawful arrest. 
Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1988. Be-
cause the Chadwick-Sanders rule 
did not substantially serve privacy 
interests, the Court held that sepa-
rate treatment for an automobile 
search extending only to a container 
within the vehicle was no longer 
required under the Fourth Amend-
ment. Id. at 1989. 
ers. Id. The Court further reasoned that 
In both Chadwick and Sand- the Chadwick-Sanders rule had 
ers, police conducted a warrantless "confusedcourtsandpoliceofficers 
search of luggage which was being and impeded effective law enforce-
transported in an automobile. AI- ment." Id. It was not always clear 
though police had probable cause to whether there was probable cause to 
suspect the luggage, they did not search a package or an entire ve-
have probable cause to suspect that hicle. Id. at 1989-90. For example, 
the vehicles were carrying contra- if an officer had probable cause to 
band. Id. at 1986-87. Inbothcases, believe that an automobile contained 
the Court refused to extend the drugs, began to search the vehicle 
Carroll doctrine to include the war- and immediately discovered a pack-
rant less search of luggage merely age of drugs, arguably either rule 
because it happened to be trans- could apply. Id. 
ported in an automobile. Id. at This confusion was further dem-
1987. The Court emphasized the onstrated by the factthat since 1982, 
heightened privacy interest a person state courts and federal courts of 
expects in his or her luggage and appeals had been reversed in their 
personal effects, and concluded that Fourth Amendment holdings 
this interest was not diminished by twenty-nine times. Id. at 1990. 
the presence of such items in a ve- Because of this confusion, the Court 
hicle. Id. at 1986-87. concluded that it was better''to adopt 
In overruling the Chadwick- one clear-cut rule to govern auto-
Sanders rule, the Court reasoned mobile searches and eliminate the 
that the rule afforded minimum pri- warrant requirement for closed con-
vacy protection to individuals and tainers set forth in Sanders . . . . 
impeded effective law enforcement. The interpretation of the Carroll 
Id. at 1989. The Court recognized doctrine set forth in Ross now ap-
that "a container found after a gen- plies to all searches of containers 
eral search ofthe automobile and a found in an automobile." Id. at 
container found in a car after a lim- 1991. Thus, police may conduct a 
ited search for the container are warrantless search of an automobile 
equally easy for the police to store or any container in the automobile 
and for the suspect to hide or de- as long as the search is supported by 
stroy." Id. at 1988. The Court noted probable cause. Id. 
that under New York v. Belton, By its decision in Acevedo, the 
453 U.S. 454 (1981), law enforce- Supreme Court simplified the con-
ment officers could not only seize a fusing law surrounding the automo-
container and hold it until a warrant bile exception to the warrant clause 
was obtained, but could also search of the Fourth Amendment. While 
containers without a warrant as a this may lead to more effective law 
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enforcement, the privacy interests 
of the individual may have been 
compromised. The fact that privacy 
rights in personal effects are lost 
immediately as one enters a moving 
vehicle may lead to an abuse of 
police power and less protection for 
the individual. 
- Kim-Haylee Loewenstein Band 
Florida v. Bostick: POLICE 
OFFICERS MAY BOARD BUS 
AND RANDOMLY ASK 
PASSENGERS FOR CON-




In Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 
2382 (1991), the Supreme Court 
decided that a seizure did not auto-
matically occur when police offic-
ers boarded buses and asked passen-
gers for consent to search their lug-
gage. The Court stated that while 
the Fourth Amendment does pro-
hibit unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, it does not prohibit voluntary 
co-operation. 
During a stopover in Ft. Lauder-
dale, two police officers boarded a 
bus and, without reasonable suspi-
cion, requested permission to search 
the defendant's (Bostick) luggage. 
The police officers did not use 
threats, and Bostick was explicitly 
told that he had the right to refuse 
consent. Bostick consented to the 
search which led police to find co-
caine in his luggage. 
Bostick argued that a seizure took 
place when police officers boarded 
the bus and asked for consent to 
search his luggage. Bostick moved 
to suppress the evidence on the ba-
sis that it was improperly seized in 
violation of his Fourth Amendment 
rights. The Florida District Court of 
Appeal affirmed the trial court's 
denial of Bostick's motion, but cer-
tified the question of seizure to the 
Florida Supreme Court. B e c au s e 
the encounter took place in the 
cramped confines of a bus, Bostick 
argued that the police presence was 
much more intimidating than it 
would be in another setting. Bostick, 
111 S. Ct. at 2386. Reversing the 
lower courts' decision, the Florida 
Supreme Court held that a seizure 
resulted when the police officers 
randomly boarded the bus and with-
out articulable suspicion, asked for 
the passengers' consent to search 
their luggage. Id. at 2385 (citing 
554So.2dat1154(Fla.1989». The 
court reasoned that a seizure oc-
curred because a reasonable passen-
ger "would not have felt free to 
leave the bus to avoid questioning 
by the police." Id. The court thus 
adopted a perse rule that bus searches 
were unconstitutional. The United 
States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to decide whether the Florida 
per se rule was compatible with 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
In addressing the issue ofwhether 
a police encounter of this nature 
constituted a "seizure" within the 
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme 
Court outlined established case law 
which demonstrated that "a seizure 
does not occur simply because a 
police officer approaches an indi-
vidual and asks a few questions." 
Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2386. The 
Court stated that "[s]o long as a 
reasonable person would feel free 
'to disregard the police and go about 
his business,' the encounter is con-
sensual and no reasonable suspicion 
is required." Id. (citing California 
v. HodariD., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 
(1991». 
The Court then rejected Bostick's 
claim that his case was different 
because it took place in the cramped 
quarters of a bus. The Court rea-
soned that Bostick's movements 
were confined not because police 
conduct was "coercive," but because 
he was a passenger on a bus that was 
scheduled to depart. Id. at 2387. 
Because a person traveling on a bus 
has no desire to leave, the presence 
of the police was not an accurate 
measurement ofthe coerciveness of 
the encounter. Id. 
The Court then cited INS v. 
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984), 
which it found to be dispositive of 
the issue. In Delgado, the Court 
held that a seizure had not occurred 
when workers were questioned in 
their workplace and were not free to 
leave without being questioned. Id. 
(citing Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218). 
The Court observed that the offic-
ers' conduct provided the workers 
with no reason to believe that they 
would be detained if they refused to 
answer any questions. Id. The 
Delgado Court emphasized that the 
workers' ability to leave was not 
restricted by the police officers, but 
by voluntary obligations to their 
employers. Id. 
The Court stated that Bostick's 
case was analytically indistinguish-
able from Delgado. Id. Like the 
workers in Delgado, the Court rea-
soned that Bostick's movement was 
restricted by a factor independent of 
the police conduct. Id. Therefore, 
according to the Court, the "free to 
leave" analysis used by the Florida 
Supreme Court was not the correct 
inquiry. Id. The Court held instead 
that the "appropriate inquiry is 
whether a reasonable person would 
feel free to decline the officers' re-
quests or otherwise terminate the 
encounter." Id. The location ofthe 
encounter is only one ofthe factors 
to be considered in determining 
whether a seizure had occurred. Id. 
In observing that its opinion is 
consistent with prior decisions, the 
Court noted that it has previously 
stated that ''the crucial test is whether, 
taking into account all of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the encoun-
ter, the police conduct would 'have 
communicated to a reasonable per-
son that he was not at liberty to 
ignore the police presence and go 
about his business.''' Id. (citing 
Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 
567, 569 (1988». Consequently, 
the Court held that it was not per se 
unconstitutional for police officers 
to board buses and randomly re-
quest passengers' consent to search 
their luggage. Id. at 2389. In light 
of its decision, the Court remanded 
the case to the Florida courts to 
determine whether a seizure took 
place. 
Although the Supreme Court 
claimed that no new ground was 
broken by its decision, it is now 
clear that police officers may pursue 
drug interdiction efforts on buses. 
Prior Court decisions have allowed 
police officers to question individu-
als in such places as the workplace, 
in airport lobbies, and on city streets. 
The reasoning in Florida v. Bostick 
indicates that individuals will no 
longer be immune from police ques-
tioning in many other public places. 
The Court's decision has sent a 
message that police may question 
individuals anywhere they please so 
long as the encounter is not coer-
cive. 
- Will Jacobi 
Craig v. State: THE COURT OF 
APPEALS REDEFINES 
WHEN AN ABUSED CHILD 
IS CONSIDERED SUFFI-
CIENTL Y UNAVAILABLE TO 
TESTIFY AND ALLOWS FOR 
THE TAKING OF TESTI-
MONY BY CLOSED-CIRCUIT 
TELEVISION. 
In a case of constitutional im-
port, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land clarified when it is appropriate 
for a trial court judge to order the 
testimony ofa child abuse victim to 
be taken outside the courtroom 
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